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Smallholders have important roles to play in both the 
prevention of dangerous climate change by reducing net 
global Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions, and our global 
ability to adapt to climate change. However, smallholders 
have largely failed to benefit from international financial 
mechanisms established as a result of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
We propose that this is due to the design of these 
mechanisms, which in their current formats are largely 
inaccessible to smallholder groups. The purpose of this 
paper, which draws on literature and interviews, is to 
examine finance and risk-related obstacles hindering 
smallholders from participating in current carbon finance 
mechanisms. It also suggests a framework for identifying 
how to prioritize and aggregate smallholders to achieve 
mitigation at scale. 
In the Introduction, we provide our working definition 
of ‘smallholder’: a household operating a small area 
of land (compared to the national average), that uses 
no, or limited hired labour. We also briefly describe the 
complexity of assigning such a definition, illustrated by 
summarizing different smallholder characteristics in Asia, 
Latin America and the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa. 
In addition, the Introduction describes why smallholders 
are important in the context of climate change mitigation 
and adaptation: that they as aggregated groups manage 
large areas of land, relying heavily on it for survival, and 
that incentives linked to terrestrial mitigation can have 
significant social and economic benefits in addition to 
mitigation. A short overview of existing carbon finance 
schemes is also provided, which highlights the issue of 
scale (aggregation) in achieving meaningful results.
A brief section on aggregation follows the Introduction. 
First, the various forms of aggregation are described: 
horizontal aggregation occurs among actors on the 
same production level, and vertical aggregation occurs 
where there are increased links between different 
steps in the value chain. Aggregation may bring more 
economies of scale and group bargaining power, but may 
also contribute to locking smallholders into damaging 
agreements, resulting in low individual bargaining power 
for smallholders within the aggregating institution. Contract 
farming models are provided as examples of aggregation. 
Links between market exposure and aggregation are 
also briefly described, in that the types of markets 
that smallholders are engaged in affect aggregation 
opportunities and models.
The third section describes financing sources and delivery 
options for providing smallholders with GHG mitigation-
related incentives. This section also describes risk 
factors that smallholders are faced with. Eight potential 
sources of funding for smallholder activities, and delivery 
mechanisms for financial benefits are considered. 
These are: (1) self-financed, (2) community, family and 
friends, (3) local banks supported by the government, (4) 
microfinance Institutions, (5) private companies investing 
for production, (6) charities and development institutions, 
(7) private financial institutions, investing for profit, and (8) 
the local government budget.  Each source is assessed 
on the basis of the type of capital provided, duration, 
requirements for provision and the current, as well as 
future potential for being a source and, or a mechanism 
for mitigation-related finance. Potential sources are: 
communities, family and friends (including remittances) 
and charities and development institutions. Potential 
mechanisms are: local banks, microfinance institutions, 
private companies, charities and development institutions 
and governments. Only charities and development 
institutions currently act as sources and mechanisms.
Section 3 also examines production-related, farmer, 
institutional, and governance risks faced by smallholders, 
and risk mitigation instruments. Climate change is likely to 
increase the risks that smallholders face, and to impact 
on their ability to generate quantifiable mitigation. Both 
informal and formal risk management strategies are 
described. Informal risk management strategies exist 
both at household and community levels. Formal risk 
management strategies include indemnity and index-
based insurance. Examples are provided of a formal risk 
management scheme that involves smallholders, and 
the Philippine Coop Life Insurance and Mutual Benefit 
Services programme. It is clear that reducing the incidence 
and severity of adverse events may be an important co-
benefit to smallholders participating in terrestrial mitigation 
programmes. Identifying overlapping components 
in mitigation and adaptation programmes involving 
smallholders (such as monitoring, reporting and verification 
systems and local weather information collection) 
warrants further investigation, particularly in the context of 
government-led mitigation programmes. 
Section 4 compares smallholder versus carbon financier 
requirements and also provides a general framework for 
developing approaches for large-scale mitigation activities 
that include smallholders. This section contains a gap 
analysis (Table I) and also briefly examines some existing 
approaches being employed by carbon credit project 
standard developers in the voluntary carbon markets 
to encourage smallholder participation, for example, 
Plan Vivo and the Climate, Community and Biodiversity 
Alliance. 
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that could be used at the national or sub-national (rather 
than project) level for identifying which smallholders 
to work with, and approaches to develop appropriate 
incentive mechanisms. The steps can be summarized 
as: (1) Identify areas of highest physical potential for 
carbon storage or GHG emission reduction. This 
should also include an evaluation of the potential types 
of mitigation interventions, and be combined with a 
socio-economic assessment to determine who are the 
relevant stakeholders and a locally appropriate definition 
of ‘smallholder’. (2) Examine local socio-economic 
conditions, focusing on resources that the smallholders 
have access to and with whom they currently interact. 
(3) Consider production that might be displaced by the 
GHG mitigation activity. Once this information has been 
collected and analyzed, evaluate which smallholders might 
be most effectively engaged in a GHG mitigation activity, 
and what a potential approach might be for engaging 
them.  Note these steps are based on the assumption that 
GHG mitigation is the overarching aim of the programme.  
Also, thorough and on-going engagement with 
communities is required during the development of this 
and in the determination of a final programme. Developing, 
implementing and monitoring community engagement and 
buy-in is fundamental to success.  Tools for carrying out a 
complementary bottom-up assessment are not covered 
in this paper; however we refer to existing tools that 
complement the conceptual framework described. 
Section 5 provides recommendations for various 
stakeholder groups:
Government agencies in developing countries: 
Overlaps often exist between what is needed for 
agricultural and rural development, and for smallholders 
to engage in mitigation programmes: Governments could 
better internalize climate change mitigation and adaptation 
into their economic development, agricultural investment 
and growth plans. Emerging carbon finance mechanisms 
are increasingly targeted to governments and could be 
used to support programmes that are required for socio-
economic development of smallholder groups as well as 
mitigation. Existing programmes that include smallholders 
could also use carbon finance mechanisms to leverage 
greater impact, e.g. payouts under Indonesia’s Plantation 
Rehabilitation Programme could be made dependent 
on adoption of mitigation practices. Public private 
partnerships are also worth exploring: Governments could 
work with entities such as contract farming businesses, 
Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) and local micro-insurance 
providers to develop and implement land and activity 
registers, credit agencies and data collection systems. 
This could go hand-in-hand with the development and 
implementation of “climate smart” codes of conduct 
for contract farming and Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDI) related to land use investments. Governments 
could support the uptake of these through appropriate 
legislation.
Private finance institutions: Investors, insurers, financial 
institutions, MFIs:
There is currently little visibility on how profits can be 
made from low carbon investments in agriculture. Private 
financial institutions could work with governments to 
develop and implement GHG mitigation activities, e.g. 
they could be engaged in designing locally-appropriate 
products that combine risk management, adaptation, 
GHG mitigation and GHG Monitoring Reporting and 
Verification. However they are likely to require incentives 
and, or, support from governments, donors or multilaterals 
to do this. Private sector actors can carry out some 
activities unilaterally, e.g. climate screening of investments 
and operations. Businesses with supply chains in relevant 
areas may also wish to assess opportunities for setting 
up carbon insetting activities by building the costs of 
ecosystem services into supply chains (the Plan Vivo 
insetting approach).
Multilateral agencies, research agencies, donors and not 
for profit entities
This group plays important roles in supporting research 
and development of terrestrial carbon mitigation 
programmes. However, activities to engage private sector 
actors could be up-scaled. For example, multilateral and 
bilateral agencies are currently developing land investment 
principles, these could include requirements to assess 
and disclose GHG impacts, paving the way for rewarding 
low-carbon FDI and help host governments assess GHG 
emissions. To facilitate this, tools could be developed to 
help investors and companies understand and quantify the 
environmental impact of agricultural investments. 
They also have important roles to play in supporting 
governments in appropriate service provision for 
institutions and processes. For example, they could 
support the provision of better agricultural extension 
services, which could include a GHG mitigation and 
adaptation component. Another activity that could be 
carried out is an assessment of government tenure and 
business registration arrangements and how they relate to 
smallholder mitigation activities. They could also conduct 
and make available market research on smallholder 
requirements related to mitigation (and adaptation) so 
that government institutions and potential investors can 
better develop appropriate products and services. They 
could work with governments to facilitate and help run 
competitions to demonstrate how GHG mitigation can 
be incorporated in agricultural development initiatives 
that include smallholders, for example in the African 
Mechanisms for agricultural climate change mitigation incentives for smallholders
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Enterprise Challenge Fund (AECF). They could support 
standard setting and local certification agency capacities 
in developing countries, particularly where mitigation 
opportunities are highest. They can also provide the 
necessary upfront funding and human resources required 
to develop smallholder-relevant businesses with positive 
GHG-mitigation impacts, e.g. helping to facilitate or broker 
‘patient capital’ and similar blended funding instruments to 
leverage greater (and better quality) commercial investment 
in agriculture that provides benefits to the climate and to 
smallholders.
Carbon finance and policy makers engaged in climate 
change activities
Policy makers focused on climate change should focus on 
the long-term viability and requirements of smallholders’ 
business (assets, risks, financing) in designing and 
implementing mitigation incentives. This requires a 
consideration of who would generate the mitigation and 
how they would benefit. They may wish to carefully consider 
and design co-benefit offerings with smallholders and other 
potential stakeholders such as private companies so that 
rewards are adequate and appropriate. Carbon financiers 
and policy makers may also wish to explore ways to 
reduce reporting or MRV costs and complexity of attaining 
mitigation benefits through collaborations with various types 
of organizations. Also, they should focus on promoting high 
quality projects through risk-mitigation instruments and 
standards. Good business practices should be employed, 
including transparency in agreements with smallholders and 
partner institutions. This includes facilitating mechanisms to 
increase GHG benefit transparency ‘fairness’. Policy makers 
should promote liquidity and market certainty, if pursuing a 
market-based approach.
CCAFS Report No. 6
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Global interest in food security and climate change have 
received much attention over the past three years, particularly 
since the food price spikes of 2008 and extreme weather 
events, such as the 2011 drought in the Horn of Africa. 
Overlaps between food security, climate change mitigation 
and adaptation (resilience) in developing countries are only 
beginning to be explored. Smallholders have an important part 
to play in both the prevention of dangerous climate change 
(mitigation) and our global ability to adapt to it. Despite this 
they have largely failed to benefit from international financial 
mechanisms established by the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to tackle dangerous 
climate change. We propose that this is due to the design of 
these mechanisms, which in their current format are largely 
inaccessible to smallholder groups.
The purpose of this paper, which draws on literature and 
interviews, is to examine finance and risk-related obstacles 
that hinder smallholders from participating in current carbon 
finance mechanisms that reward mitigation. It also suggests a 
framework to prioritize and aggregate smallholders to achieve 
mitigation at scale. We conclude this paper with a series of 
recommendations for stakeholder groups: policy makers in 
host and donor countries, financiers (both general and carbon-
focused) and independent not-for-profit entities (research 
organizations and non-governmental organizations). 
In the introduction (Section 1), we describe who smallholders 
are, how they influence, and are influenced by climate change 
and the current carbon finance mechanisms related to them. 
Following on from this in Section 2, we describe models 
for aggregating smallholders – an issue which must be 
addressed in order to achieve scale. Section 3 describes some 
of the financing sources and delivery options for providing 
smallholders with mitigation incentives. This section also 
describes risk factors facing smallholders. Section 4 compares 
smallholder requirements and those of carbon financiers and 
also provides a general framework for developing approaches 
for large-scale mitigation activities that include smallholders. 
Finally, Section 5, based on the previous analysis, proposes 
a set of recommendations for potential supporters, including 
host governments, donors and private companies, to better 
include smallholders in mitigation efforts. The paper draws on 
examples from South America, Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. 
1.1 Smallholders in context 
Who are smallholders?
The definition of a ‘smallholder’ varies considerably within the 
literature. A definition relying only on area managed may ignore 
significant factors, including resource quality, production type, 
available institutional arrangements and access to services. 
Smallholders can be identified based on farm size (such as 
those operating less than two hectares [ha]), dependence 
on household labour, relative gross domestic product (GDP), 
resource access, and asset base (land, capital, skills, labour). 
This paper uses the term to refer to a household operating a 
small area of land (compared to the national average) that uses 
no, or limited, hired labour (IFOAM 2002; FAO 2004). 
A smallholder’s income sources may be diversified on and 
off-farm to a greater or lesser extent. This diversity is a product 
of, among others, market exposure, geographical location and 
infrastructure, government policies and local social norms. 
Smallholders may be linked into a variety of value chains 
that are domestic or international in their reach. Such links 
may have far reaching consequences in terms of access to 
resources. The following sections provide an overview of 
smallholders within each of the regions covered in this paper.
The Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) context
LAC smallholders are typically family farms, largely utilizing their 
own labour. Recent analysis suggests that there are about 15 
million family farms in LAC (Berdegué and Fuentabla, 2011), 
controlling approximately 400 million ha, which can be divided 
into three broad categories (Figure 1). Mexico has the greatest 
number of smallholders in the region (FAO 2010). 
1. Introduction
Figure 1: Smallholders in LAC (FAO 2009a).
Subsistence farmers - income primarily from non-farm jobs, remittances, subsidies (ca. 10m farmers 
with ca. 100m ha)
SSc producers with some market integration (ca. 4m farmers controlling ca. 200m ha)
SSc farmers that hire permanent labour, on the verge of being fully commercial (ca. 1m farmers 
managing ca. 100m ha)
Proportion of remaining agricultural land
44%
14%
28%
14%
9Regional emissions from the Agriculture, Forestry and Land 
Use (AFOLU) sectors are significant, with an estimated 20.3% 
contributed by agricultural activities and 47.4% from forest-
related activities (Gardi et al. 2010). The largest emitters in the 
region from the forestry sector are Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia 
and Peru. Small-scale agriculture and shifting cultivation are 
the largest direct drivers (Gardi et al. 2010). Brazil, Paraguay, 
Argentina and Jamaica have sizeable greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions from agriculture (UNEP/GRID-Arendal 2011). 
 
Where smallholders in LAC have been able to engage in foreign 
markets, with high value and niche production such as organic 
coffee, fair trade markets for bananas, coffee, fresh fruit and 
vegetables, honey, fruit juice and sugar have, and will continue 
to be, important. LAC has at least two thirds of the world’s 
certified producers. 
The majority (80%-90%) of formal landowners in the region are 
men (Deer and Leon 2003). Smallholder women constitute the 
poorest population group in the region, and tend to have very 
limited access to markets. This is due in part to conflict, gender 
inequality, natural disasters, migration by men and structural 
adjustments (World Bank 2009). 
The Asian Context
If the smallholder criterion of 2 ha is applied, this region has the 
greatest proportion of the world’s smallholders (approximately 
87%) (Thapa and Gaiha 2011). A summary of smallholder 
numbers in selected Asian countries is provided in Table 1. 
Smallholder land-holding size trends vary considerably. In 
India, where the average farm size is declining, the number 
of marginal holdings (less than1 ha) rose 3.6-fold from 1961 
to 2003, and the proportion of India’s farmland operated by 
farmers holding less than 1 ha rose from 7% to 22% (NSSO 
2006; Zhou 2011) . In China, 97.5% of farmers hold less than 
2 ha and this proportion has been relatively stable (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China 2010). Market exposure and the 
route to market vary significantly. In China, for example, 92% of 
farmers sell their produce, and of these, 63.5% sell to doorstep 
traders (Zhou 2011). 
The share of women farmers in Asia has remained nearly 
constant for the last 30 years (FAO 2011). In Eastern Asia, 
China has the highest proportion of women farmers (48%) and 
in Southern Asia, India has the highest proportion (over 30%) 
years (FAO 2011). Asian women are more likely to be employed 
in agriculture than in other sectors. 
The sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) context
If the criterion of 2 ha is applied, about 80% of all farmers 
in SSA fall into this category. Estimates of smallholders in 
selected countries in the region are summarized in Table 2. The 
FAO predicts that the number of smallholders in the region will 
continue to increase until the year 2020 (Zhou 2011). 
Most smallholders in this region have poor market access, and 
a decreasing resource base. It is estimated that only one third 
of smallholders in several parts of the region are net sellers of 
farm products (Staatz 2011)1. A 2003 study (Jayne et al. 2003) 
of smallholders in Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Mozambique and 
CCAFS Report No. 6
Country Number of smallholders
China 193m
India 93m
Indonesia 22m
Bangladesh 17m
Viet Nam 10m
Nepal 3.1m
Philippines 3.0m
Myanmar 1.9m
Thailand 1.9m
Table 1. Smallholders in Asia (FAO 2010)
Country Number of smallholders
Ethiopia 9.4m
Nigeria 6.2m
D.R. Congo 4.3m
Tanzania 3.5m
Kenya 2.9m
Uganda 2.8m
Mozambique 2.6m
Table 2. Smallholders in SSA countries (FAO 2010)
1  Surveys conducted in Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Somalia, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
between the mid-1980s and 2002 found that in no country were more than 
half of the smallholders, net sellers of staples; the modeal figure is closer to 
one third. In Ethiopia only 25% of smallholders were net sellers of either teff 
or maize, and only 25% were net sellers of maize in Mozambique. (Staatz 
2011)
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Zambia quantified the decline of average smallholder farm 
size. This same study also demonstrated that the proportion 
that off-farm income contributes to a smallholder’s livelihood 
is negatively correlated with land size. However, in none of the 
five countries surveyed do households earn more than 50% of 
their total revenues from off-farm sources. 
A large percentage of SSA smallholders are women. They are 
increasingly responsible for the farm as male urban migration is 
significant and growing (Livingston et al. 2011). In SSA women 
farmers make up 70% of agricultural labour. They provide 60%-
80% of household food consumption labour, 90% of the work 
required to source water and fuel wood, 80% of labour required 
for food storage and transport, 100% of basic food processing, 
90% of hoeing and weeding work, and 60% of harvesting 
and marketing services (World Bank 2009; FAO 2009b). 
Despite this, they often do not have equal rights to land and 
resources, and face poor access to credits, skill training, and 
new technologies (World Bank 2009, pg 175). The FAO 2009b 
states that in SSA women are responsible for selling and 
marketing traditional crops such as maize, sorghum, cassava, 
and leafy vegetables in local markets, while men tend to be 
more heavily involved in commercial production.
1.2 Smallholders and climate 
change
Smallholders, in aggregate, manage large areas of land
Globally, the agricultural sector accounts for 13.5% of GHG 
emissions, while land use, land use change and forestry 
(LULUCF) represent 17.4% of GHG emissions (IPCC 2007). 
To have a significant mitigation impact, an activity must have 
scale, in that it must take place over a large land area, and or, 
have a high impact per unit of activity. Mitigation activities that 
smallholders could adopt are unlikely to generate significant 
volumes of mitigation per individual farm, hence aggregation 
is important. In many developing countries aggregated 
smallholders manage significant proportions of agricultural land 
and should therefore be part of the mitigation solution. The 
aggregation issue is considered in Section 2. 
AFOLU mitigation practices that could be implemented by 
smallholders include (Seeberg-Elverfeldt and Tapio-Biström 
2010): conservation agriculture, agroforestry and silvopastoral 
systems, improvement of land management systems (coffee, 
cocoa, forests, livestock), compost production, bio-energy, 
organic farming, afforestation and reforestation (A/R), and 
reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD). 
Smallholders’ vulnerability is impacted by the quality of their 
natural resource base
Smallholders inherently depend on the productivity of their 
land. However, they are often unable to practise sustainable 
land management due to a lack of resources and, or know-
how. Therefore, conceptually they should be considered 
eligible for support to change their practices – making them 
more productive whilst maintaining the intrinsic value. This 
also adds weight to the argument that more effort should go 
into designing appropriate mitigation schemes that consider 
smallholders, in particular their revenue and risk profiles. 
Therefore it is imperative that smallholders’ revenues and risks 
must be considered in the design of appropriate national and 
local mitigation activity engagement schemes that engage them. 
Socio-political context influences who participates in mitigation 
and adaptation activities
Women in smallholder households tend to focus on 
subsistence production and are largely the main producers 
of food, while men tend to focus on commercial crops (FAO 
2006). Although globally women constitute a large share of 
the farming population, they often lag behind men in terms of 
access to land, labour, water, rural infrastructure, technology, 
credit, market-related information, training and advisory 
services. Tenure, for example, tends to be highly skewed 
towards men. To be effective, mitigation activities must 
consider local and national socio-political contexts. 
Mitigation activities could benefit smallholders in a variety of 
ways 
Although participating in the global effort to mitigate climate 
change might motivate a smallholder to take part in an activity, 
it is unlikely to be the primary driver. Where smallholders 
are recognized as land managers, for a mitigation activity to 
be of interest to smallholders, and for them to change their 
management practices, a net benefit must be demonstrated. 
This can take the form of revenue enhancement, and, or, 
risk reduction. Benefits linked to mitigation can be tangible 
or intangible. Examples of tangible benefits include: cash 
payments linked to carbon credits and subsidized or free 
inputs. Intangible benefits could include access to training 
programmes and institutional support (for example, through 
forming cooperatives and providing extension services) and 
increased tenure security. Land tenure uncertainty is often an 
obstacle to greater and longer-term smallholder investment 
in their land. A contractual relationship that demonstrates 
smallholders’ land management rights within a mitigation 
project might therefore be a significant motivator.
Adaptation as a co-benefit to mitigation
AFOLU mitigation activities can increase local economic or 
environmental resilience. An improved ability to cope with local 
climatic changes (adaptation-dividend) can be a reduction 
to livelihood risks and income variability. As Box 1 illustrates, 
increased resilience (such as a reduction in risk) may in some 
cases be a greater motivator for smallholders to participate in a 
mitigation activity than generate new revenues. 
1.3 Smallholders and carbon 
finance schemes
Overview
International acknowledgement of the adverse impact 
of GHG emissions has led to various governmental and 
Mechanisms for agricultural climate change mitigation incentives for smallholders
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nongovernmental-driven schemes to promote mitigation 
activities, accompanied by financial incentives. In developing 
countries, these have been based largely on payments for 
performance and generating distinct units of mitigation (such as 
carbon credits) through implementing specific projects (project-
based mechanisms). Initiatives that seek to have wider-scale 
impacts are being developed in response to outcomes at the 
Copenhagen and Cancun meetings of the UNFCCC. Countries 
are currently developing a variety of mitigation initiatives 
focusing on specific sectors, types of activities or regions (for 
example, Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions, NAMAs). 
These are described below and in detail in a complementary 
paper (Streck and Burns 2011).
Non-project based mitigation activities 
These differ from project-based mechanisms in terms of: 
•	 activity	scalability,	as	the	government	designs,	implements	
and manages the initiative; 
•	 sources	of	funding;	
•	 the	output,	which	is	not	usually	discrete	units	of	mitigation	
(credits). 
The value that developing country governments place on GHG 
mitigation from the agricultural sectors is reflected in their 
NAMA submissions: the majority of country plans submitted to 
the UNFCCC have included agricultural activities. 
Multilateral and bilateral funding has been instrumental in 
supporting these initiatives, while the role of private sector 
capital in such schemes over the long term is likely to vary 
by country. For example, a government could introduce a 
reduced tax rate or subsidize loans to private companies for 
implementing specific GHG mitigation activities, or they could 
develop national MRV schemes and incentives that support 
the scaling-up of project-based approaches such as the 
Programme of Activities (PoA) approach.
Project-based mechanisms
Project activities carried out in a set area can lead to discrete 
units of mitigation being generated. Volumes of mitigation 
units are determined using criteria and approaches are 
enshrined in various standards and their methodologies. 
These are summarized in Table 3. Note these only refer to 
smallholder-relevant GHG mitigation activities. Standards can 
be categorized by those generating credits for the regulated 
market, under the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol CDM (clean 
development mechanism), and the voluntary carbon markets 
(VCMs). Credits developed under the CDM (known as Certified 
Emission Reductions – or CERs) can be traded on international 
exchanges and are relatively liquid. The prices of voluntary 
emission reductions (VERs) on the other hand tend, to be less 
liquid and less transparent. 
Two standards have also been developed that do not result 
in GHG mitigation units, but rather are ‘overlays’ to ensure 
positive, social and environmental impacts: the Climate, 
Community and Biodiversity Standard (CCBS) and Social 
Carbon Methodology. CCBS was designed for use exclusively 
with land use projects. Social Carbon Methodology develops 
specific social benefit indicators based on project type and 
specific circumstances; indicators have been developed for 
A/R projects. 
Project-based mechanisms: approaches to overcome the 
issue of scale
Most standards apply some form of category to project size, 
based on the total expected number of GHG mitigation units 
generated by a project. Small-scale (SSc) projects are usually 
allowed to take advantage of less onerous procedures. This is 
to level the playing field for smaller projects, which tend to have 
disproportionately high transaction costs, but also greater co-
benefits. However, SSc projects remain in the minority for the 
more mainstream standards that do not have an emphasis on 
co-benefits (such as CDM and VCS). 
Another approach designed to encourage aggregation and 
contain costs is the CDM PoA approach that allows distinct 
CPAs (CDM programme activities) that use the same project 
methodology and PoA project document to be aggregated. 
Box 1. Smallholders in mitigation and adaptation: Thailand case 
study (Srang-iam 2011)
A recent study conducted on several rural sites in Thailand considered (i) how local adaptation contributes to global climate change 
through reducing or removing emissions, and (ii) how the government’s mitigation schemes have affected local livelihood by altering 
the vulnerability of farm households. Site-based interviews and assessment of the national policies and programmes highlighted the 
differences in concerns, the main concern of farmers being their ability to secure their livelihoods in the face of climatic uncertainty, 
while the government was to achieve net GHG reductions – these government interventions did not explicitly consider local resilience 
impacts. The study indicated that the most vulnerable farmers were the ones that were most likely to adopt high-GHG emitting farming 
practices. Farmers that were vulnerable were excluded from government mitigation programmes, such as tree planting schemes, due 
to lack of tenure documents. The author concludes: “national climate policies should prioritize the need of local farmers in adapting to 
climate change over the effectiveness in global emissions reduction. Such policies could aim at providing marginal farmers support for 
low carbon adaptation strategies.”
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PoA methodologies also provide the opportunity to convert 
carbon finance from one implemented CPA, to finance upfront 
costs of other CPAs. This is being trialed with small-scale 
energy projects in particular. 
GHG mitigation benefits: the various project types have 
different economic profiles
There is a distinction to be made with regards to the timing 
and scale of costs and revenues of different project types, (see 
Table 4). Carbon credit investors are faced with a variety of 
projects to invest in, and will usually prioritize those that have 
the highest expected returns. Land use carbon credit projects 
have to date been largely uncompetitive in comparison to non-
land use project opportunities.
Mechanisms for agricultural climate change mitigation incentives for smallholders
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Products Activities 
generating 
product
Conditions for production Unique characteristics of 
product
CERs** A/R, bio-energy, 
waste management, 
EE
CDM methodology must be applied. 
Stakeholders must be informed of the 
project and their concerns addressed. 
Validation and verification of project. Credits 
must be registered in CDM registry. SSC 
methodologies and procedures are less 
onerous but must demonstrate engagement 
of low-income communities.
Can be used to meet Kyoto 
Protocol targets, relatively 
liquid.
VCUs 
generated 
under VCS
ARR, ALM, IFM, 
REDD, PRC, CDM 
project types
Same as above, standard has own 
methodologies, e.g. for land use projects 
outside CDM. CDM methodologies can 
be applied where appropriate. Registration 
possible in several voluntary registries.
Buffer to mitigate delivery risk.
Plan Vivo 
certificates
A/R, agroforestry, 
forest restoration, AD, 
forest conservation
Same as above but Plan Vivo methodology 
applied – can be adapted to local conditions. 
Must be designed with local community. 
Strict benefit sharing requirements.
Unique ability to issue credits in 
advance. Focus on community 
engagement and benefits.
Gold 
Standard 
VERs
RE and EE projects 
only.
Same procedure as above but specific 
Gold Standard methodologies exist. CDM 
methodologies can be applied where they 
exist. Sustainable development co-benefit 
focus in methodologies.
Used alone as VER or as “add-
on” to CDM projects (CER).
CFS-VER New forests only (A/R) Same procedure as above but uses own 
methodologies, including procedures to 
quantify sustainable development benefit.
Includes a buffer. Relatively 
simple methodology.
VER+ CDM-eligible project 
types, all types of 
LULUCF including 
REDD if a buffer is 
applied.
Same procedure as above and CDM 
methodologies applicable. Other approaches 
used for projects where CDM methodology 
cannot be applied.
Captures projects that fall 
outside CDM, e.g. due to 
country status or timing.
Table 3. Overview of the most common international mitigation products relevant to smallholders in developing countries* 
Abbreviations: afforestation, reforestation and revegetation (ARR), agricultural land management (ALM), avoided deforestation (AD), carbon fix standard (CFS), energy 
efficiency (EE), improved forest management (IFM), peatland rewetting and conservation (PRC), renewable energy (RE), small scale (SSC), verified carbon units (VCUs)
*  Note that region or country-specific initiatives e.g. the Chinese Panda Standard, are not included.
**  Temporary CERs (tCERs) and long-term CERs (lCERs) are implicitly included, as a type of CER.
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Project type Cost elements Benefit elements Additional comments
Energy generation and 
efficiency projects e.g. 
improved cook stoves, 
solar cells
•	Purchase,	distribution	and	
installation of equipment
•	Maintenance	and	replacement
•	Annual	carbon	credits
•	Cheaper	energy	or	reduced	
energy cost
High upfront costs, relatively 
quick returns. Precedent of 
financing e.g. by MFIs.
New forests (A/R) •	Land	preparation
•	Seeds	/	seedlings
•	Planting
•	Maintenance
•	May	be	costs	to	secure	land
•	May	be	infrastructure	costs
•	Periodic	carbon	credits	(usually	
at year 5 and once every 5 years
•	Forest	and	non-forest	product	
sources when plants mature)
High upfront costs. Relatively 
long time for rewards (carbon 
and non-carbon). Initial 
volumes of benefit small. 
Forest management 
and forest protection 
activities
•	May	be	costs	to	secure	land
•	Forest	management
•	May	be	infrastructure	costs
•	Periodic	carbon	credits	(usually	
immediate and once every 5 
years)
•	Possibility	of	generating	
immediate income depending 
on resource.
High upfront costs. Shorter 
time than A/R for initial benefit 
but may be infrequent. Initial 
volumes of benefits may be 
large. 
Non-forest land 
protection and 
rehabilitation
•	Land	preparation
•	Seeds	/	seedlings
•	Planting
•	Maintenance
•	May	be	costs	to	secure	land
•	May	be	infrastructure	costs
•	Productivity	increases
•	Carbon	benefits	likely	to	be	
small per ha and very uncertain 
(relatively new methodology)
Up front costs and time to 
receive non-carbon benefit may 
be relatively quick – carbon 
credits not likely to be most 
significant benefit.
Table 4. Costs and benefits of project types relevant to smallholders
Note that all projects incur similar carbon-related costs. Upfront, one-off carbon-related costs include: carbon credit project documentation development, validation, 
project registration. Ongoing carbon-related costs: monitoring reporting and verification (MRV), management of carbon credit project element, periodic verification of 
project, registry and issuance fees. 
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Investments, including for mitigation, require a minimum scale 
to be financially profitable. Production capacity per smallholder, 
including for mitigation, is low, therefore aggregation is a 
necessity for activities involving smallholders. Aggregation 
requires commonalities, on the production and, or, outputs 
side. Regional differences, as described in the Introduction, 
may be a factor in determining possible aggregation models. 
An example of an aggregation commonality is the production 
of a particular marketable produce (such as Arabica coffee) 
and, or similar production conditions (such as operating under 
similar climatic and biophysical conditions). 
How can smallholders be aggregated?
Smallholders can be aggregated in a variety of ways; 
the occurrence and appropriateness of different forms of 
aggregation is likely to vary considerably. Aggregation can 
facilitate integration – the linking of different participants 
within and amongst components of the value chain. Vertical 
integration refers to the control by a single entity of several 
steps in the production and, or distribution process. Horizontal 
integration refers to when different actors at the same level are 
linked; that is, it refers to one step in the production process.2 
Table 5 provides an overview of aggregation models. 
Pros and cons of aggregation
There are both benefits and drawbacks associated with 
aggregation and integration: for example, there may be 
economies of scale and increased group bargaining power but 
smallholders may also be locked into damaging arrangements 
and have low individual bargaining power within the 
aggregating institution. 
Contract farming as an example of aggregation
Opportunities may exist to incorporate mitigation activities 
into existing aggregation schemes, such as through existing 
contract farming programmes. Contract farming refers to 
“Agricultural production carried out according to a prior 
agreement in which the farmer commits to producing a 
given product in a given manner and the buyer commits to 
purchasing it- these contracts may be formal or informal (oral); 
the purchaser may provide ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ assistance (credit, 
inputs, training etc.); and the price may be fixed, set by a 
formula or unspecified” (Minot 2011). A mitigation activity could 
also drive aggregation. 
Product type and production conditions are known to 
determine the suitability of aggregation. According to the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), contract 
farming makes most sense when it concerns high value crops, 
with large quality variations, that are perishable, have a high 
initial cost or input cost and the crop is difficult to grow, or 
new to the farmer. Also, it is more prevalent when the end 
consumers are willing to pay a premium (Minot 2011). The 
nature of the product that a mitigation activity can produce is 
described in the Introduction (Tables 3 and 4). 
Market exposure and aggregation
Existing market exposure affects the ease with which 
smallholders can be involved in mitigation projects. 
Smallholders engaged in formalized contract farming 
schemes may already receive payments based on production 
performance. Theoretically, adding an additional production 
requirement and payment is possible. However, this requires 
an investment in terms of educating and incentivizing the 
aggregator to manage the GHG mitigation component in 
addition to their existing activities. The level of investment 
required for working with existing aggregators based on 
agricultural production, or developing new ones, is debatable. 
For example, smallholders already operating their farm more 
profitably may have a higher opportunity cost of land or 
labour and, under certain circumstances, may require higher 
incentives to participate in mitigation activities.3 Smallholders 
producing purely for subsistence may have little experience 
of contractual arrangements and little or no exposure to 
supporting services and infrastructure. Different types of 
smallholders are therefore likely to need different forms of 
incentives and support to implement GHG mitigation activities. 
Thus, consideration must be given to how to aggregate 
smallholders most effectively. For example, there may be 
lower individual payments required to incentivize subsistence 
smallholders but the institutional cost of engaging them may be 
higher.
2. Challenges and opportunities of 
aggregation 
3  For example, this was demonstrated by a study in Latin America (Haab et al. 
2009)
2  An example of vertical integration is the Shea quality value chain consultative 
processes in Ghana and Burkina Faso which lead to local standards being set 
that rewarded women for adopting processes that resulted in better quality (and 
higher value) produce.
Mechanisms for agricultural climate change mitigation incentives for smallholders
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Model Sub-model Description
Driven by smallholders
Cooperatives and 
farmer controlled 
institutions (horizontal 
integration)
Associations, trusts, enterprises, 
cooperatives, farmer owned 
companies
Formalized groups of smallholders with legal standing. Many different 
structures exist depending on the institution’s purpose e.g. marketing 
agency vs. producers’ cooperative.
Contract farming (can 
be horizontal or vertical 
integration)
N/A Smallholders group together to lease land to third party, e.g.  
a commercial farm manager.
Driven by third party such as agribusiness or exporter
Contract farming 
(vertical integration)
Highly centralized Institution that buys from a large number of smallholders and imposes 
demands on produce quantity and quality.
Nucleus estate Institution that buys through a centralized model, combined with a 
nucleus estate managed by the institution.
Multipartite Joint venture between a third party and a local entity representing 
smallholders and in a contractual relationship with them.
Informal Verbal purchase agreements, usually completed on a seasonal basis.
Intermediary Institution that has a contract with an intermediary who signs up 
individual smallholders.
Tenant farming or 
share cropping (vertical 
integration)
N/A Contracting of smallholders to manage land owned or leased by third 
party.
Table 5. Smallholder farmer aggregation models (Havemann 2011)
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The previous sections described how smallholders are relevant 
for mitigation, and the types of benefits they might receive from 
engaging in mitigation activities. This section considers sources 
and delivery mechanisms of financial incentives for mitigation 
and evaluates them in the context of smallholder requirements.
3.1 Assumptions about 
smallholder requirements 
The evaluation presented here relies on the assumption 
that smallholders need awareness of, and access to, 
revenue enhancing and risk reducing benefits to have 
an interest, and to participate, in mitigation projects and 
programmes. As Table 6 summarizes, these needs may 
be tangible or intangible. We assume4 that smallholders 
currently have (IFOAM. 2002):
•	 low	annual	revenues	that	vary	seasonally,	and	may	
fluctuate significantly depending on a variety of factors 
such as weather and off-farm employment opportunities;
•	 high	household	costs	relative	to	revenues:	a	large	
proportion of household income is spent on food, water 
and energy;
•	 high	vulnerability	to	events	(risk	factors)	that	impact	on	
production, such as plant and animal diseases or a death 
in the family.
These factors will be re-visited in Section 4, where we 
assess how GHG mitigation incentive sources and delivery 
mechanisms could address them.
3.2 Characterization of 
financing types and sources
Financing for production, including production of GHG 
mitigation, can come from a variety of sources and take 
different forms such as grants, equity, loans, or a combination 
of these. Loans may be provided on a variety of terms and may 
recoup the principal plus interest, or as prepayment against 
expected production. They can be domestic or foreign in origin. 
Production, including for mitigation units, requires both long 
and short-term financing. Short-term financing is usually debt, 
and used to cover short-term (less than one year) production 
costs and working capital. This may be tied to orders, such as 
from supermarkets demanding deliveries of particular quantities 
and qualities of produce. Mid and long-term financing is usually 
more senior, long-term debt and, or equity and is typically 
required to start a business or invest in capital expenditure. It is 
usually tied to business strategy (Diakité 2011). 
Figure 2 illustrates domestic and foreign sources and delivery 
mechanisms. Foreign sources include bilateral or multilateral 
funds (channeled through overseas development assistance), 
various forms of private sector investment (including for the 
purpose of generating carbon credits) and philanthropy. It is 
usually difficult and expensive to identify and transact direct 
with smallholders due to lack of information, education and 
awareness, as well as poor rural infrastructure. Therefore, 
it is more common to reach smallholders through delivery 
institutions such as cooperatives or community based 
organizations. 
3.3 Overview: financing pro-
duction in smallholder systems
This section summarizes the type of capital that can be 
provided, requirements for its provision and an evaluation of 
it as a potential source and delivery mechanism of funding for 
GHG mitigation in smallholder agricultural systems. Figure 3 
shows an evaluation of the types of capital provided by the 
sources 1-8 in Figure 2 above. Short summaries are given 
for sources 1-8. Note: smallholders may fall into multiple 
categories depending on products generated. 
3. Supporting smallholder production: 
financing and risk mitigation 
4  These assumptions are based on general characteristics of smallholders found in 
the literature. (IFOAM. 2002) 
Mechanisms for agricultural climate change mitigation incentives for smallholders
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Potential revenue enhancing and risk-reducing support to address need
Primary benefits (direct)
Smallholder 
assumptions
Tangible 
(Value is quantifiable)
Intangible 
(Value difficult to quantify)
Little, seasonal and 
insecure household 
revenue
•	Payment	for	GHG	mitigation	units
•	Provide	new	income	generating	opportunities	e.g.	
new produce, processing facilities, employment
•	Improved	earnings	through	provision	of	quality	
and consistent extension service
•	Improved	earnings	by	receiving	more	per	unit	of	
produce
•	Dividends	/	profit	share	from	selling	product	
associated with project
•	Clarification	and	improvement	of	tenure	
•	 Improved	market	access
•	 Institutional	development
•	Decreasing	irregularity	of	smallholder	
incomes e.g. by introducing new, diverse 
income sources and providing access to 
storage
•	Agricultural	training	and	techniques
High relative 
household and 
production costs
•	Support	to	displace	or	reduce	production	costs	
e.g. inputs, energy 
•	Support	to	displace	or	reduce	living	costs	
•	 Improvement	of	local	facilities	(healthcare	/	
schools)
High vulnerability to 
events that impact on 
production
•	Provide	access	to	facilities	that	can	extend	the	life	
of products e.g. processing and storage facilities
•	Provide	access	to	formal	production	and	family	
insurance
•	Access	to	savings	opportunities
•	 Improved	information	access	(e.g.	on	
weather)
•	Training	on	nutrition	and	health
•	 Increased	local	resilience
Co-benefits (indirect)
•	Training	in	financial	literacy
•	Smallholder	political	representation
•	Gender	awareness
Table 6. Smallholders needs and how they can be met by GHG mitigation-linked benefits 
Figure 2. 
Characterization of 
finance sources and 
delivery mechanisms 
(The numbers in 
circles refer to Section 
3.3 and Figure 3 
below). 
Sources of financing for smallholders
State / 
Multilateral
Private  
(funds & co’s)
Philantropic
Individuals
(remittances)
Fo
re
ig
n 
so
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ce
s
2
4
5
6
7
8
1
Smallholder
3
Local 
smallholder 
group e.g. 
cooperative
Local companies, banks 
& investment funds
Central/Local 
Government
Local MFI
Local community
Local state agency
Rural state bank
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Figure 3. Evaluation of financing sources for incentivizing GHG mitigation in smallholder agricultural systems. 
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Self-financed and controlled
This situation, where the smallholder is entirely self-financed, 
can be considered the ‘default’. This group includes wealthier 
smallholders, as well as highly disadvantaged subsistence 
farmers with no access to third party financing. The 
smallholder must have built reserves, as well as confidence 
that the investment will be successful. They may also be 
encouraged to pursue this strategy as a result of cultural 
norms (such as investing in livestock as a form of savings), 
and, or where there are few other opportunities for safely 
storing extra resources; for example, where assets cannot be 
converted into cash and there are no local savings facilities. 
The size of the available investment is likely to be small and 
affected by personal circumstances. Tenure arrangements 
may be an important consideration in terms of the type and 
duration of investment. Smallholders are not likely to invest 
solely for the purpose of GHG mitigation.
Informal and semi-formal sources: friends, family and informal 
lenders 
This involves informal financial support from members 
of the community, such as remittances from friends or 
family and village savings and loans associations (which 
we consider semi-formal). Currently, the majority of 
financing for smallholder agricultural production is domestic 
(local communities, friends and family and remittances). 
Investments through individuals or organizations familiar 
with, and to, the smallholder may provide distinct benefits 
in terms of channeling support for mitigation activities, in 
that they may be more familiar with the type of financial and 
non-financial support required,, and there may be more 
community pressure to succeed. Additionally, because the 
funding often relies on trust, there may be no requirement for 
collateral, or for aggregation. Box 2 provides an example of a 
Ugandan entrepreneur who used personal funding to build a 
successful business engaging smallholders. 
Drawbacks of this type of funding to the smallholder:
•	 risk	of	community	discontent	if	targets	are	not	met;
•	 funding	may	favour	certain	groups	based	on	social	
norms rather than potential and performance (nepotism, 
gender discrimination); 
•	 funding	sizes	are	usually	small	and	scaling-up	may	be	an	
issue;
•	 repayment	demands	may	be	affected	by	personal	
circumstances; 
•	 terms	may	not	be	clear	and	enforceable;
•	 informal	sources	(loan	sharks)	may	charge	very	high	
interest rates.
The potential scale of funding is large. For example recent 
estimates from the African Development Bank show that 
migrant remittances to Africa will be USD 22 billion in 2011 
and USD 24 billion in 2012 (African Economic Outlook 2011). 
However, aggregating domestic sources and remittances 
may be difficult. Tapping into remittances and encouraging 
diaspora investment in agriculture is of increasing interest. 
For example, IFAD and the US State Department recently 
launched the ‘Diaspora Investment in Agriculture’ initiative.6 
Effectively tapping into this source relies on local banking 
institutions, often with the support of local and foreign 
governments, donors and multilateral agencies. For example, 
governments might need to offer a tax reduction to investors 
in a remittance bond to encourage participation. In contrast, 
the example provided in Box 2 illustrates a potential 
mechanism for delivery of this source of funding. However, it 
is difficult to assess how many similar opportunities there are. 
Therefore, although this is a large potential source it is likely a 
poor mechanism.
Box 2. Sunshine Foods in Uganda: building a successful business 
with smallholders5
In 2007, the founder of Sunshine Foods decided to set up a chili growing and export business in Uganda. The area she targeted, in 
northeast Uganda is dominated by smallholders. She initially looked for extension and other farmer networks to work with, but did not 
find any adequate partners, so she decided to invest her own money in recruiting and training extension workers. She also provided 
inputs to the farmers – due to the lack of collateral she had to do this purely on a trust basis. In the early stages of the project she 
went to the local bank; however she was denied funding for the farmers due to lack of collateral that could be registered and lack of 
a track record (they demanded min. 3 year financial statements). Her strategy is to buy from groups, to ensure strict quality criteria, to 
ensure that smallholders understand the conditions, yet that they are supported in growing this new crop. Initially the farmers were very 
sceptical about adopting a new crop, and they were unsure of demand (price, volumes, stability, and so on). Four years since starting 
her business, she is getting a return on her initial investment, her products occupy a majority of the market and she is planning similar 
grassroots agribusinesses in the region.
1
2
5  Sources: Interview with Pamela Anyoti Peronaci and (New Agriculturalist 2011).
6  This initiative will assist and encourage investments by migrants in business opportunities that 
enhance food security, generate economic opportunity and foster job growth in rural areas. 
More information can be found at: http://www.ifad.org/media/press/2011/35.htm
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Domestic and government supported banks (excluding 
private banks and microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
This refers to banks that provide project and personal 
finance products and services and are supported by local 
government, such as dedicated agricultural banks. The ability 
of these institutions to offer products and services to rural 
smallholders depends on a variety of factors, including the 
local policy framework and domestic savings rates. They 
can be the executor of government policies, for example 
on subsidized lending rates for agriculture, but are typically 
restricted by local infrastructure and transaction size. 
Their financing policies may be affected by cultural biases, 
including discrimination against women borrowers.7 Financing 
policies that are supported by governments are also affected 
by the quality of government management.
Given other competing opportunities, local banks are, by 
themselves, unlikely to be a large source of investment. 
That is, unless the local government provides incentives and 
support for them to do so, or they participate in a donor-
supported programme. Additionally, financing project-based 
initiatives, for example by accepting smallholder-produced 
agricultural carbon credits as collateral, is an unlikely avenue 
for such institutions. The reasons for this are that:
•	 projects	borrow	to	finance	production,	such	as	against	
delivery of a future product. The inability to deliver the 
future product is probably a result of a failure to produce, 
which reduces the likelihood of carbon revenues. In other 
words, the risk of production is related to the value of the 
collateral. 
•	 smallholder	mitigation	activities	tend	to	produce	VERs.	
The value of a VER is set through negotiation so it may be 
difficult to assign a value to the contract. Credits are also 
not liquid, meaning that the bank may impose a very high 
discount on the value of the credit as a collateral, making 
it inefficient and typically insufficient. 
In summary, local banks are by themselves, unlikely to be 
a significant source of finance. However, if the banks have 
a good rural distribution network, they may be a potential 
mechanism.
Microfinance institutions 
MFIs are institutions that provide small loans, over relatively 
short periods (usually between six and twelve months). Their 
strategies to overcome transaction costs are to lend small 
amounts to many individuals, to rely on community pressure 
to encourage repayment, to favour lending to women who 
tend to have higher repayment rates, and to favour clients 
who have a good track record and collateral. Funds are 
usually business, rather than consumption related, and 
targeted to the poor. 
There is much geographic variation in how MFIs operate. 
In Latin America, for example, MFIs tend to work with 
individuals; in South East Asia there has been a greater focus 
on village savings and loans (VSL) models. Prevalence of 
MFIs, particularly in rural areas is facilitated by infrastructure 
such as roads and mobile phone networks. In some places 
they are more prevalent than the local banks. Most MFIs 
source part of their funding, directly or indirectly, from 
multilateral development agencies. This is illustrated by the 
example of FOPEPRO in Box 3.
MFIs have the ability to finance fast-yielding production. 
Smallholder agricultural mitigation project activities are likely 
to take more than one year from inception to significant yield 
output. In addition, MFIs base their business on return on 
principal plus interest, not monetization of products such as 
carbon credits. So although their mechanism may in many 
cases be well suited to reach smallholders, they are unlikely 
to be a relevant source.
Box 3. A new MFI in Latin America: Fondo para los Pequeños 
Productores Rurales en América Latina (FOPEPRO)8 
This social investment fund, which is supported by the IDB and two private social investment companies “aims to promote the 
economic development of small farmers by providing loans for the production, processing and marketing of staple food crops 
(maize, beans etc.) and high value non-traditional exports such as cocoa, coffee, bananas, sesame, vegetable crops and dairy 
products across most countries in Central and South America… [it] will provide loans to three types of borrowers: smallholder or-
ganizations, rural MFIs, and processing and marketing small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) which are part of the agricultural 
producer value chain. Loans will finance working capital, medium term investment loans and subordinated loans with a maximum 
tenor of five years.”( IDB 2011)
7  “In Cameroon, for example, although a woman is now legally allowed to start 
a business without her husbands consent, a husband may still formally object 
to his wife’s exercise of a trade or profession if he judges it not in the interest 
of their marriage or children. In Swaziland, women are not allowed to register 
property and they need a male guardian’s consent to open a bank account or 
start a business.” From http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-
matters/2011/jun/14/africa-women-entrepreneurs-overlooked
8 IDB, “FOPEPRO”. More information can be found at: http://acerola-  
management.com/en/fo_vision_en and http://www.sidi.fr/fopepro.php 
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Private companies investing for production (including carbon 
credit developers)
Private companies that source their products from 
smallholders often have an incentive to support production. 
The main forms of this value chain finance are: “(1) Provision 
of credit, savings, guarantees or insurance to or among 
value chain actors, (2) Strategic alliances through financing 
extended by a combination of value chain actors and financial 
institutions, (3) Tools/services to manage price, production or 
marketing risks.” (Devlin and Kormawa 2011)
Relationships between producers and off-takers are 
fundamentally underpinned by trust and track record, and 
may not always be enshrined in a formal contract. Support 
is usually short term, and based on seasonal production. 
However, there may be longer-term arrangements for tree 
crops, but this is likely to be in the form of non-cash support, 
such as provision of infrastructure. 
To receive this type of support, smallholders will usually 
have to demonstrate that they can deliver minimum quality 
and quantity of produce at a given time – this requires 
infrastructure. Support is usually limited to smallholders with 
produce destined for international markets, or, in the case 
of larger developing economies, urban centres. Prices are 
often tied to international commodity markets, which may 
not reflect local economic circumstances. In some cases, 
the bargaining power of smallholders may be limited, which 
can put them at risk of abusive contracting practices, and 
dependency on a large off-taker may restrict a smallholder’s 
long-term opportunities.
Pre-financing of CERs or VERs by carbon credit project 
developers and funds is a form of financing for production. 
The conditions under which projects can generate carbon 
credits are described in the Introduction. Carbon credit 
projects tend to have high transaction costs, usually favour 
countries that already host such projects and have clear 
national rules about ownership of carbon and a history of 
tenure enforcement. Sequestration-based projects tend to 
take longer to generate significant volumes, and uncertainties 
exist about quantifying carbon storage and sequestration in 
soils. Due to the small volumes produced per smallholder, 
aggregation is a necessity. However, these types of activities 
could provide significant co-benefits and enhance existing 
agriculture or forestry projects that involve smallholders, such 
as out-grower schemes for logs. Box 4 below, illustrates 
some specific challenges to value chain financing in Bolivia 
– many of these are also relevant for any type of production, 
including mitigation.
Due to the restrictions on agricultural and smallholder 
carbon credit projects described in the Introduction, and 
uncertainties surrounding the future of carbon markets, this is 
not, at the moment, likely to be a significant source. Currently, 
bilateral and multilateral donors and charities have a more 
significant role in financing these types of projects. However, 
if global regulations change, or if appropriate local regulations 
are enacted, the private sector could be a significant 
source of financing. Private companies that already engage 
smallholders could provide an interesting mechanism to reach 
them.
Charities and development institutions 
This encompasses a wide range of financial support such 
as debt, equity, grants, loan guarantees, risk insurance, and 
non-financial support (training, materials etc.). Note that 
development institutions also provide direct budget support 
to developing country governments. However, as these funds 
flow through the local government, this is covered in the 
following section. 
Box 4. Twelve challenges to value chain finance for Bolivia’s 
farmers (Schiff and Stallard 2009) 
Challenges are summarized as: (1) Systemic risk such as weather and crop failure. (2) Market risk generated by cyclical and seasonal 
price fluctuations. (3) Credit risk including lack of collateral and incomplete support services. (4) Investment returns are limited and 
slow in Bolivia, where rural capital revolves slowly with one or two crops per year. (5) Low investments and assets which provide 
limited collateral options. (6) Geographic dispersion makes economies of scale difficult to achieve. (7) Inadequate infrastructure 
capacity including communications, roads, social services, all of which increase the cost of lending. (8) Technical capacity and 
training is lacking: limiting adaptation to new technologies, productivity and competitiveness. (9) Social exclusion inhibits integra-
tion into financial markets and reduces market efficiency. (10) Institutional capacity, including management and technical capacity of 
organizations in rural Bolivia is lacking and results in few new products being piloted to meet farmer and small business need. (11) 
Political and social interference such as forgiving loans, withholding savings, capping interest rates, and subsidies create a potential 
risk for financial intermediaries. (12) Regulatory risks include excessive requirements and, or lack of enforcement of regulations, 
hindering the viability of business and financial operations in rural areas. 
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Analysis carried out in 2010 by the Corporate Leadership 
Coalition for Smallholder Farmer Livelihoods identified some 
key trends in development assistance for smallholders in the 
agriculture sectors (Pfitzer et al. 2010):
•	 smallholder	focused	aid	accounted	for	just	2.2%	of	the	
combined aid budgets of 29 donors, representing USD 12 
billion in funding;
•	 Africa	receives	proportionally	more	funding	for	smallholders	
compared to other regions, followed by Asia and the 
Americas;
•	 the	majority	of	funding	is	for	“direct assistance to 
smallholders on training and, or providing them with inputs 
to improve their yields and incomes” (Pfitzer et al. 2010, 
p9), followed closely by access to markets and finance for 
smallholders, and finally, for improving their infrastructure 
and operating environment.
In addition to providing financial and technical support, 
these institutions, and particularly the multilateral and donor 
agencies, can play an important role in structuring new 
products that increase and improve investments in rural areas. 
For example, multilateral agencies can structure remittance 
bonds, ‘green growth bonds’9, development bonds and 
securitization bonds (USAID 2003). Multilateral agencies can 
also provide risk reduction facilities, such as guarantees or 
political risk insurance. For example, Terra Carbon LLC recently 
signed an agreement with the US Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) which provides them with a political risk 
insurance for a REDD project in SEA10. Note that these types of 
products require scale, and therefore aggregation is necessary. 
Charities can play an important role at a local level – both in 
terms of financial and non-financial support. For example, 
they can establish community-based organizations that can 
develop into formally aggregated institutions. Additionally, they 
can support these aggregated institutions to interact with the 
private sector, as illustrated by the example in Box 5. Many 
charities have taken the lead in developing terrestrial carbon 
mitigation projects, particularly as the carbon markets have 
been too uncertain, or profits look too small to interest purely 
profit-driven companies. Charities aim to demonstrate that their 
work has had an impact; thus, to access this type of funding a 
smallholder has to partner with a local institution, which may be 
an issue when quality partner organizations do not exist. 
Although this may be a potentially significant source of funding, 
there are questions to be raised about financial sustainability. 
If not properly designed, this form of support can lead to aid 
dependency and local market distortions. Programmes may 
also be misaligned when compared to smallholders’ needs. 
This source should be considered a short to medium-term 
financing opportunity. As a mechanism for delivery, this may be 
a good way of engaging smallholders, but this option should 
be pursued only in the short to medium term for a particular 
smallholder group.
Private financial institutions investing for profit 
This encompasses institutions such as foreign banks operating 
in the country, and investment funds. Note, they are not 
investing to gain a tangible product as such, but to get a return 
in the form of capital. They tend to have the same restrictions 
as local banks associated with the government (No.3 above), 
but also have access to capital from developed country 
markets that could be put to use. They are typically generalists, 
and considering the range of investment alternatives they face, 
are not likely to be a significant source. Additionally, their reach 
may be equal or less than that of local banks, so they are 
similarly unlikely to be a good distribution mechanism.
Government budget (national or regional)
How the government is organized and operates, including 
the level of decentralization and devolution impacts on the 
connections between smallholders, smallholder groups 
and state. Indirect support is provided to smallholders by 
investments in infrastructure, decisions on price controls, taxes 
and subsidies. Government bodies may engage directly with 
smallholders through agriculture and non-agriculture facilities 
such as rural health-care and education facilities. They may 
also provide support through rural agricultural extension 
services and improved seed distribution programmes. In 
addition they may interact with smallholder farmers groups, 
such as cooperatives.
7
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Box 5. An example of business-NGO partnerships to facilitate 
smallholder trade (Oxfam 2009)
Aj Ticonel is a Latin American company that works with a local NGO to facilitate smallholder production. The company first informs 
OPCION, the NGO, on volumes and quality standards required according to orders received from their clients. OPCION draws up 
a production schedule with each producer group to develop detailed plans for sowing and production. Technicians associated with 
OPCION work with the producers to meet the demand. The produce is delivered to group-owned collection points. A significant 
equity share of Aj Ticonel belongs to the smallholders. This business model is suitable for higher-value produce. 
9 The World Bank, for example, have launched a number of green bonds, see: 
http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/htm/WorldBankGreenBonds.html
10 http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20110630005407/en/Terra-Global-
Capital-Signs-Groundbreaking-OPIC-REDD
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Support is usually in the form of services, or subsidized 
access to goods or services. For the purpose of this paper, we 
classify these as grants. Support flows through government 
policies, which typically takes some time to put in place and to 
dismantle. It can therefore be classified as a long-term facility. 
To access these, smallholders may have to prove that they 
have a ‘right’ (hence tenure might be necessary) and may have 
to be in an accessible location (access to infrastructure). 
Developing country governments are unlikely to provide large 
budgets on their own for GHG mitigation activities, particularly 
if they perceive more pressing development issues. Historical 
responsibility for GHG emissions also lies with developed 
countries and there is a strong feeling they should shoulder 
most of the cost. Hence, donors and multilateral agencies 
often provide budget support for government programmes 
and initiatives. However, as people’s wellbeing becomes 
increasingly affected by climate change, developing country 
governments also have a responsibility to pursue actions that 
protect them. In addition, there can be win-wins between 
agricultural resilience and GHG mitigation activities. In 
summary, government agencies are unlikely to be a significant 
source of finance, at least in the short to medium term. 
However, they can be a mechanism for creating awareness of, 
and distributing benefits linked to GHG mitigation.
3.4 Risks and risk 
management
It is important to consider the role of risks to smallholders: 
climate change is likely to increase the risks that smallholders 
face, and to impact on their ability to generate GHG mitigation. 
Reducing the incidence and severity of adverse events may be 
an important co-benefit to smallholders participating in GHG 
mitigation programmes. Smallholders’ risks can be broadly 
divided into three categories: production risks, farmer risks and 
institutional and governance risks. Note that the issue of risks 
is also covered in a complementary paper (Streck and Burns 
2011). 
3.4.1 Risks faced by smallholders
Production risks
Production risks refer to natural factors (weather, pests, 
diseases) and market factors (price of seeds, fertilizers, 
pesticides and food price volatility). Smallholders tend to have 
low resource endowments, especially land and capital assets, 
so production risks tend to have a significant impact when 
manifested (Moschini and Hennessy 2001). Limited access 
to financial instruments reduces the capacity of smallholders 
to invest in production and revenue enhancing instruments, 
such as improved inputs and access to storage facilities. In 
turn, uncertainties in farm and household incomes may further 
limit access to production credit because of increased (or 
perceived) loan default risks. 
Farmer risks
Farmer risks occur from ill health, lack of skills and social 
standing. Illness represents a major risk amongst smallholder 
farmers because it can reduce production and increase 
household costs. Death is another considerable shock that 
also removes a contribution to income and the household 
economy, and may impose the large unexpected cost of a 
funeral.
Institutional and governance risks
Institutional and governance risks refer to those posed by 
interacting with financial institutions, the government (regulatory 
environment) and conflict. Poor governance may affect the 
capacity of people to access and maintain assets, services 
and utilities. It may also lead to increased transaction costs 
associated with investments. 
3.4.2 Risk management 
Risk management instruments can reduce the cost, 
unpredictability or severity of risks to the smallholder. They 
can be classified as informal or formal risk management 
mechanisms, as summarized in Table 7 (AFRACA 2009).
3.4.3 Risk mitigation at household level
Farmers in developing countries tend to have little access to 
formal risk management solutions, and usually rely on informal 
coping mechanisms. These include: enterprise diversification, 
altered production techniques, reallocation of labour, high 
discount rates on new practices, maintaining reserves of non-
interest-earning assets that are sold in the event of a shock, 
reducing household consumption and, or investment such as 
educating children, especially girls. Each of these strategies 
may provide short-term relief but in the longer term may 
contribute to increased household poverty and vulnerability. 
Buffer stocks accumulation (money, land, livestock and other 
assets) is also a common risk mitigation strategy. Livestock 
particularly represents an important component of household 
risk mitigation, as animal products can be sold throughout the 
year (IFAD 2010a). They are also relatively easy to sell but are 
vulnerable to the effects of climate change (IFAD 2010b). 
3.4.4 Risk sharing at the community level 
Community-level savings and credit associations help farmers 
to mitigate risks by developing a pool of savings and a local 
source of borrowing. Examples include: extended families, 
cooperative labour arrangements, group sharing of the costs 
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Informal risk management  
Farm household level
(Risk mitigation)
•	 Savings
•	 Buffer	stocks
•	 Enterprise	diversification
•	 Low	risk,	low	return	crop	
•	 Production	techniques
•	 Sale	of	assets
•	 Reallocation	of	labour
•	 Reduced	consumption
Community level 
(Risk sharing)
•	 Food	crop	sharing
•	 Common	property	resource	management
•	 Social	reciprocity
•	 Household	size,	social	networks
•	 Rotating	savings/credit
•	 Sale	of	assets
•	 Transfers	from	mutual	support	networks
Formal risk management
Market-based
(Risk sharing and transfer)
• Contract marketing 
•	 Financial	hedging	tools
•	 Traditional	insurance
•	 Weather-index	insurance
•	 Micro-insurance
•	 Contingency	funds	for	disaster	relief
•	 Savings	
•	 Credit
and benefits of livestock herding, and a jointly owned storage 
and processing infrastructure. However, as IFAD 2010 states, 
many of these strategies fail when risks affect a large number 
of members at once. 
3.4.5 Formal risk management 
instruments
Insurance can be divided into indemnity-based insurance 
(traditional insurance), index-based insurance and micro-
insurance. Insurance penetration in general remains very low 
in developing countries. For example, Latin America, Asia and 
sub-Saharan Africa together accounted for only 21% of the 
world insurance premium total in 2008 (Wenner 2010). 
Indemnity-based insurance
Traditional insurance, or indemnity-based insurance, 
reimburses a client the estimated financial loss resulting from 
a shortfall, or loss in yield at the time of harvest. The cover 
can be either multi-peril crop insurance or single peril crop 
insurance. Traditional insurance is usually reinsured, in that 
the local insurance company transfers all or part of the risk to 
a reinsurer. In this way, insurer and reinsurer share premiums 
and risks, thereby making the premiums more affordable. 
Agricultural indemnity based instruments protect against 
livelihood and asset losses generated from catastrophic events 
and can concurrently improve access to finance, as risks are 
transferred from farmers to third parties. Boxes 6 and 7 provide 
examples of two innovative insurance products that are being 
trialed in Ethiopia.
Index-based insurance
Index-based insurance pays out based on the value of an index 
rather than actual losses measured at field level. Examples of 
indexes are rainfall, temperature, humidity, crop yield and river 
levels. Payouts occur when the index (such as rainfall) is below 
a total agreed value over a certain period (insurance against 
drought related crop loss). Such schemes do not require farm 
level assessments. 
Table 7. Overview of risk management instruments
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Index versus indemnity-based insurance
The main advantage of index-based insurance is a lower 
transaction cost compared with indemnity insurance. This 
makes it more appetizing for private sector insurers in 
developing countries and more affordable. Index-based 
insurance can either be sold at the micro level (such as to 
smallholders) or at the meso level (to cooperatives). However, 
index-insurance does not come without shortfalls. The 
robustness of index assessment depends on the availability 
and reliability of quality data, often lacking in developing 
countries, and it is vulnerable to basis risks (when insurance 
payouts do not match actual losses). Contract design is 
particularly important in order to avoid basis risks (Hellmuth et 
al. 2009). 
Micro-insurance schemes
Micro-insurance is usually targeted at low-income farmers 
in developing countries with limited access to traditional 
insurance. Micro-insurance aggregates multiple individual 
smallholders or smallholder groups into larger groups where 
risks can be pooled. A wide variety of risks can be covered, 
such as life, health and asset insurance. It is typically provided 
to low-income individuals in combination with microfinance 
loans. Note that these products tend to be pooled at several 
levels for reinsurance purposes; for example at village level, 
regional level and then reinsured at national level. 
One example is the Münich Re and GTZ partnership in the 
Philippines, implemented in partnership with the Philippine 
Coop Life Insurance and Mutual Benefit Services (CLIMBS). 
This product is designed to protect the loan portfolios of 
cooperatives against losses from extreme weather events. 
Extreme events pose serious risks to microfinance institutions 
like cooperatives, obliging them to impose high interest rates 
on loans. In order to guarantee liquidity to the cooperatives in 
case of, for example, typhoons (measured in terms of extreme 
wind speed and rainfall), this micro-insurance product provides 
quick payouts through CLIMBS (Munich RE 2010). 
Overlaps between micro-insurance and GHG mitigation
Another point to note is that micro-insurance schemes often 
have MRV related requirements to track local conditions, and 
they typically require smallholders to adopt certain practices 
to minimize risks. For example, the Syngenta Foundation is 
building weather stations in Kenya in order to be able to deliver 
micro-insurance. This could be an interesting overlap with GHG 
MRV mitigation requirements. 
A number of insurance and reinsurance companies are 
developing micro-insurance products. Many of the large 
reinsurance institutions also have underwriting facilities for 
carbon credit projects. However, there has to date been no 
consideration of the overlap between mitigation and adaptation 
(risk reduction). For instance, it could be conceivable that there 
are some overlaps in land management and MRV requirements 
of agricultural insurance and reinsurance programmes and 
GHG mitigation programmes. 
Box 6. Nyala Insurance in Ethiopia (Meherette 2009)
Nyala Insurance S.C., for example, is an Ethiopian insurance company, that provides multi-peril crop insurance that insures farmers 
from natural and human factors affecting production yield. Payout is made to all farmers who suffered a shortfall of the pre-agreed 
long-term average yield. However, farmers must produce crops for sale, and be in areas with relatively good infrastructure to access 
this type of insurance. Indemnity based insurance usually involves (expensive) farm level assessments, is costly to administer and 
more suitable to large farms or cooperatives. 
Box 7. HARITA project in Ethiopia (Meherette 2009)
The Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA) project in Ethiopia is a relatively new mechanism that addresses the needs 
of smallholders through an unusual mix of risk reduction, drought insurance, and credit. The project adopts an innovative, holistic 
approach to risk management and integrates risk transfer (such as insurance) with risk reduction (such as improved agricultural 
practices and conservation activities) and prudent risk-taking (such as credit). It aims to increase climate resilience amongst farmers 
and improve access to micro-insurance.
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Based on the variety of smallholder groups, challenges of 
achieving scale through aggregation, and the financing and 
risk-related barriers that smallholders face, how can GHG 
mitigation-related instruments be designed in a way to 
encourage greater participation and to help scale-up terrestrial 
carbon mitigation opportunities? This section takes a step 
towards responding to this question, first by examining the 
gaps between smallholder and carbon financier/project 
developer needs, and second by proposing a conceptual 
framework for developing a strategy to identify and aggregate 
smallholders.
4.1 Smallholder needs versus 
requirements for mitigation 
activities
Designing GHG mitigation incentives for smallholders
Smallholders require a blend of financing and risk mitigation 
instruments. Access to these will depend among others, on 
assets, track record, participation in local institutions including 
aggregators, and infrastructure. Payments for GHG mitigation 
could be a way to increase the adoption of improved land 
management practices by smallholders. Engagement of 
smallholders in GHG mitigation activities, and particularly in 
the project-based mechanisms, has been hampered by the 
uncertainty and timing of benefits, upfront costs (financial and 
non-financial) and the size of potential returns11. There may 
be grounds for re-engineering incentives, particularly within 
the regulated markets and in national approaches (such 
as NAMAs) so that they are better aligned with smallholder 
requirements. However, if this is to be effective, incentives must 
fit local smallholder requirements. 
Table 8 summarizes some of the gaps between smallholder 
needs and requirements for providing benefits tied to GHG 
mitigation. As the evolution of the global, national, regional and 
voluntary GHG mitigation measures continues, possibilities are 
emerging for shaping GHG mitigation incentives so that, where 
appropriate, they can better include smallholders.
Motives of the supporters of mitigation initiatives, such as 
governments or private investors, are also an important 
consideration and result in the prioritization of units of 
mitigation versus rural development or biodiversity. Where GHG 
mitigation is the driving motive, to get the biggest ‘bang’ for 
the GHG mitigation ‘buck’, efforts should be targeted towards 
the largest, most cost effective GHG mitigation opportunities. 
Section 4.2, which considers an initial framework for identifying 
and including smallholders in mitigation, is predicated on the 
primary motive of the need for delivering GHG mitigation at 
scale. 
Approaches by Voluntary Carbon Market standards to better 
include smallholders
Barriers facing smallholders regarding their involvement in GHG 
mitigation activities have been noted by a number of voluntary 
carbon standards: The Climate, Community and Biodiversity 
Alliance (CCBA), responsible for the CCBS recognizes that 
investors often avoid projects that involve smallholders because 
of complexities and costs associated with aggregation. CCBA 
is examining possibilities to make CCBS more accessible 
for smallholder projects and to build a robust framework for 
doing so without additional complexity12. Plan Vivo is working 
towards introducing mitigation into supply chains (‘carbon 
insetting’). This means that resilience is built into supply chains 
by investing in payments for ecosystem services (PES). This 
can be done either through an existing Plan Vivo project that 
offers ecosystem services crucial to the supply of agricultural 
commodities relevant for the business, or by developing a 
new programme within a business’s supply chains, to support 
communities living in and around areas where ecosystem 
services are at risk13. It is also important to note that the issue 
of maximizing GHG mitigation per dollar invested may be less 
relevant in the case of the voluntary markets, where co-benefits 
may be as important, or more important than the actual 
quantities of GHG mitigation. 
4.2 Identifying and incentivizing 
smallholders to participate in 
mitigation activities 
Figure 4 provides an initial conceptual framework for 
identifying which smallholders to work with, and suggestions 
for approaches to creating incentive mechanisms. The 
outlined approach should be led by the national or provincial 
government, rather than the private sector; however, it can 
create the basis for designing a market-based instrument or a 
framework to house a market-based instrument. 
4. Engaging smallholders in GHG 
mitigation
11.Although Plan Vivo does allow for earlier crediting, the relatively low value of, 
and demand for, credits vs. the upfront costs are an issue.
12 Interview with Joanna Durbin, CCBA.
13.Increasing supply chain security through the Plan Vivo System: A tried and 
tested Payments for Ecosystem Services model, Plan Vivo Foundation. www.
planvivo.org
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Smallholder needs Carbon finance needs Gap causes
Access to aggregating institutions (voice, 
horizontal coordination)
Access to large number of project 
participants (scale)
High upfront costs of aggregating and 
building institutions.
Access to markets – information about 
opportunities (ICT, news, training) and 
infrastructure (roads, shops, banks), 
mechanization
Access to and communication with 
potential project participants
High upfront cost of identifying 
smallholders and making them aware of 
opportunities.
Tenure security to justify increased 
investment
Ensuring that participants own and can 
transfer carbon (if project based)
Tenure may be unclear, expensive to 
register, clarify user vs. owner rights 
(important gender component).
Access to long term finance (equity/
long term debt) to invest in livelihood 
improvements
Access to equity/long-term debt to invest 
in project/programme
Dearth of long-term finance available 
to smallholders. Investors unwilling to 
finance risky AFOLU projects with long-
term lock-in periods – compounded by 
carbon price and demand uncertainty
Access to short term finance related to 
improved production
Register and track record of 
smallholders, access to short-term debt
Lack of access to institutions and 
services, e.g. poor rural banking 
infrastructure, credit agencies, little 
registered collateral, track record 
information, no, or poor quality, credit 
registries.
Access to formal micro-insurance Diversified portfolio and/or VCS or similar 
instruments to manage risk
Weather data and infrastructure, 
aggregation of smallholders a 
requirement, understanding of contracts, 
and training.
Information to manage risks and 
opportunities. Government institutions 
including access and governance.
Data on GHG mitigation potential and 
effect of trends (e.g. for reference levels), 
including management and control of 
leakage
Lack of data and information systems, 
e.g. no consistent environmental data, 
such as national, international MRV 
systems. 
Ability of government to control 
extensification, develop and implement 
(and enforce) sound and consistent 
policies.
Improved land use management 
practices that are appropriate to them
Methodologies for quantifying mitigation 
impact
Poor or limited profitability of agricultural 
projects vs. other carbon credit 
projects; lack of good, consistent data, 
methodologies.
Certainty of incentive/support in order to 
change land use management
Demand for mitigation units (credits/other 
performance based units)
Regulatory uncertainty, market 
transparency and complexity, carbon 
credit liquidity
Reliability of counterpart e.g. carbon 
credit project developer, government
Reliability of participants Poor or non-existent contract 
enforcement, limited financial literacy, 
information and training, as well as 
proper incentives and risk management.
Preference for cash, short term returns 
(high discount rates), value of co-
benefits, support required upfront
Price per unit of mitigation, timing of 
payment for mitigation, payment against 
performance
Carbon finance mechanism is payment 
for performance based, regulatory 
uncertainty; current status of carbon 
market (liquidity, demand, prices), value 
of ‘co-benefits’ to farmer and suitability of 
intervention.
Table 8. Gap analysis of smallholder needs versus requirements for GHG mitigation benefits (‘carbon finance’)
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As the basis for providing these incentives impacts on 
atmospheric GHGs, it is important to first identify areas of 
highest physical potential for carbon storage or GHG emission 
reduction (Stage 1, Figure 4). Tools and methods already 
exist for identifying these areas. They should also include an 
evaluation of the potential types of mitigation interventions, 
such as A/R RE and should be combined with a socio-
economic assessment to determine who are the relevant 
stakeholders and who needs to implement activities, including 
identifying who constitutes a smallholder. 
When relevant smallholder groups have been identified, a 
closer examination of their socio-economic characteristics 
is required. Note that Stage 2 in Figure 4 takes a simplistic 
approach, and in reality, smallholders may produce both 
for production and to meet household needs. The purpose 
of following this approach is to understand what resources 
smallholders may be able to access (following on from 
Figure 3) and with whom they currently interact. For example 
smallholders producing for export are probably more likely to 
be part of, or have access to, an aggregating institution. The 
difference between these and subsistence farmers who have 
minimal market exposure is who the potential supporters of 
the smallholder mitigation activity are, and the type of support 
required by smallholders to engage them in mitigation activities. 
Stage 3 considers production that might be displaced by 
the GHG mitigation activity; that is the opportunity cost of 
land, labour and other production resources that might be 
utilized in a GHG mitigation activity. This is likely to reflect 
current production patterns, such as the space available on 
smallholder farms to grow trees that could have grown crops. 
In cases where smallholders were not producing previously 
(due to lack of capacity, lack of land access and so on), there 
may be no activity displacement. Obviously the opportunity 
cost depends not only on the current production patterns but 
also on the type of GHG mitigation interventions identified in 
Step 1. Following on from this, it is possible to then consider 
which smallholders might be most effectively engaged in a 
GHG mitigation activity, and what a potential approach might 
be for involving them. 
This third stage needs to be considered in the context 
of funding sources available, and the basis on which it 
is provided. For example, funds may have a clear GHG 
mitigation mandate, or may be targeted to address food 
security or private profit. Linked to this is the type and timing 
of desired results such as the periodic delivery of a carbon 
credit or emission reduction against a national baseline, or a 
seasonal profit based on agricultural operations. A payment for 
performance approach, for example, might be better suited to 
smallholders who already have some transaction experience.
The size, type and timing of investments to achieve GHG 
mitigation will also vary according to the mitigation activity 
and the type of smallholder. Studies on PES in Latin America, 
for example, found that the poorest rural households, who 
depend heavily on subsistence farming, accepted lower 
conservation payments than smallholders who were more 
diversified and sold into markets (Haab et al. 2009). Obviously, 
at this initial stage, thorough engagement with communities 
is necessary, together with an assessment of their interest 
in participating. Developing, implementing and monitoring 
community engagement and buy-in is fundamental to success. 
A number of tools exist which can help local governments and 
communities understand carbon finance and incorporate this 
type of finance into community projects.14 
Some lessons from cooperatives are relevant for GHG 
mitigation projects: focus on motivated farmers; seek out good 
businesses (and business opportunities); provide professional 
services; conduct market and client research prior to initiating 
the project; concentrate on creating market links with a range 
of service providers rather than trying to provide all services 
alone; and work with existing private sector players to improve 
quality, competitiveness and the scope of services offered to 
members (Reiquam undated).
Finally, this paper has focused on the issue of distributing 
benefits. Consideration also should be given to being able to 
‘collect production’ - in this case, gather robust estimates of 
emission reduction or sequestration. The required accuracy of 
these estimates again ties into the sources and conditions of 
funding. However, the GHG mitigation potential of smallholders 
within the agricultural sector is likely to be compared with 
opportunities in other sectors. It is also likely that a combination 
of approaches will be implemented, within different countries 
and sectors. To be more attractive to a greater range of 
potential funders, stakeholders should properly consider how 
different groups and mechanisms could work in tandem to 
streamline procedures, reduce transaction costs and leverage 
greater investment from a wider range of potential funders. 
 
 
14 For example, the IIED Community Development Carbon Finance Toolkit. 
Available from: http://www.iied.org/sustainable-markets/key-issues/
environmental-economics/community-development-carbon-finance-toolkit
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2 Evaluate local smallholders for inclusion in mitigation activities based on exposure
NB: In diverse systems, focus on maximum value product
Smallholder production
Production for sale
Domestic markets
Export products Urban centre  
markets
Local (village) 
markets
Subsistence
A B C D
Evaluate the mitigation opportunity: mitigation volumes, timing, duration, likelihood1
 
Physical characteristics, including:
•	Vegetation
•	Soil
•	Geography
•	Local	climate
•	Biological	processes
•	Flora	&	fauna
•	Human	geography
•	Infrastructure	&	access
 
Socio-economic characteristics, including:
•	Gross	Domestic	Product	(GDP)
•	Poverty	levels	&	distribution
•	Demography
•	Gender	balance
•	Education	levels
•	Governance	indicators
•	Average	land	holding	data
•	Agricultural	production	data
 Identify areas with the biggest physical mitigation potential
 Identify smallholders, develop appropriate characterization framework
Figure 4. (Stages 1 & 2): Framework for identifying smallholders to include in GHG mitigation 
activities based on provincial / district or national approaches, driven by a need for mitigation 
at scale.
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3 Initiate design and implementation of appropriate engagement & incentive schemes 
Examine the nature and scale of opportunity costs:
Export products
Opportunity costs 
linked to production 
costs, international 
prices, transport, 
storage, processing 
and export costs
Urban centre  
markets 
Opportunity costs 
linked to production 
costs, local prices, 
transport, storage and 
processing 
Local (village) 
markets 
Opportunity costs 
linked to production 
costs, local prices, 
transport, storage and 
processing
Subsistence
Opportunity costs 
linked to price 
and availability of 
production replaced  
by new activity
A B C D
 
A + B
Pros:
•	More	potential	delivery	mechanisms	to	
work through
•	May	be	easier	to	implement	payment-
for-performance based systems (e.g. 
credits)
Cons:
•	May	be	higher	opportunity	costs
•	May	not	be	widespread
Approach:
•	Work	through	existing	aggregators
•	Sustainable	production	guidelines	or	
certification where possible, e.g. for an 
industry or region
•	Could	be	combined	with,	e.g.	fiscal	
incentives
 
C + D
Pros:
•	May	have	higher	co-benefits,	e.g.	rural	
development
•	Possibly	cheaper	due	to	lower	
opportunity costs
Cons:
•	May	have	higher	upfront	development	
costs
•	May	require	more	intensive	support
Approach:
•	Focus	on	building	institutions	e.g.	local	
aggregators and local capacity
•	Develop	better	links	to	access	markets,	
goods and services
•	Likely	to	be	more	government	driven
Figure 4. (Stage 3): Framework for identifying smallholders to include in GHG mitigation activities based 
on provincial / district or national approaches, driven by a need for mitigation at scale.
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5. Recommendations for various 
stakeholder groups
The following section provides a number of high-level 
recommendations for various international stakeholder groups 
that have been mentioned in this paper. 
5.1 Government agencies in 
developing countries
Integration of climate change policies in development 
Government agencies may wish to consider GHG mitigation 
and adaptation in their economic development, agricultural 
investment and growth plans. Overlaps often exist between 
what is needed for agricultural and rural development, and 
for smallholders to engage in GHG mitigation programmes. 
For example, local infrastructure that can indirectly support 
mitigation activities such as information technology, storage 
and processing facilities, and weather stations are required 
for both types of activities. Both agricultural development 
and GHG mitigation programmes also require significant 
investments in awareness creation and training (extension 
services). Governments can play an important role in identifying 
and providing these win-win opportunities.
Examples of potential integration of climate change policies
Programmes intended to improve productivity of smallholders 
could include a GHG mitigation element. Payouts under 
Indonesia’s Plantation Rehabilitation Programme, for example, 
could be made dependent on the adoption of certain mitigation 
practices, and GHG MRV and GHG minimization (or even 
offset) requirements could be a condition for companies to 
participate in the various African growth corridor programmes. 
One existing example that could be promoted in the context of 
GHG mitigation is the Zambian Farmers’ Association No Tillage 
programme. Benefits provided in return could be financial 
or non-financial (such as extended tenure arrangements, or 
access to machinery).
Formation of partnerships
Public private partnerships (PPPs) also seem worth exploring. 
Governments could work with private sector entities such as 
MFIs, contract farming businesses, and local micro-insurance 
providers to develop and implement land and activity registers, 
credit agencies and GHG data collection systems. This could 
go hand-in-hand with the development and implementation 
of ‘climate smart’ codes of conduct for contract farming and 
foreign direct investments (FDI) related to land use investments. 
Governments could support the uptake of these through 
appropriate legislation.
Legislature: creation, amendment, implementation, 
enforcement
Developing and implementing new, and, or amended, 
legislation is likely to be necessary. For example, governments 
could assess and improve the ease of registering businesses, 
cooperatives, and farmers’ groups to encourage smallholder 
aggregation. This could also involve legalizing direct farmer-
buyer transactions, promoting development of grades and 
standards of products, strengthening of farmers’ organizations 
and other intermediaries, promoting PPPs in extension 
services, promoting competition and ensuring that contracts 
are enforceable (Minot 2011). In addition, they could consider 
developing a new registration category for ‘mitigation 
cooperatives’. Ownership of the ‘carbon benefit’ is also often 
unclear. Governments could assess tenure arrangements 
related to mitigation activities (ownership of land versus 
provision of ecosystem services), and in particular women’s 
access to these. Legislation needs to go hand-in-hand with 
improved law enforcement capacity.
5.2 Private finance institutions: 
investors, insurers, financial in-
stitutions, MFIs
Transparency and identifying opportunities for engagement
In the current context, where there is little prominence shown 
to how profits can be made from low carbon investments 
in agriculture, private financial institutions could work with 
governments to develop and implement GHG mitigation 
activities that engage smallholders. For example, they 
could design and test the spread of index-based insurance 
schemes that are appropriate for smallholders. They could 
also design locally-appropriate products that combine risk 
management, adaptation, GHG mitigation and GHG MRV, such 
as in agricultural NAMAs. However they are likely to require 
incentives and, or support from governments, donors or 
multilaterals to do this. 
Company driven initiatives
Activities that they can do on their own include climate 
screening of investments and operations. Banks could, for 
example make certain types of loans conditional on adherence 
to codes of conduct that reduce GHG emissions. Businesses 
with supply chains in relevant areas may also wish to assess 
opportunities for setting up carbon insetting activities by 
building the costs of ecosystem services into supply chains 
(the Plan Vivo approach).
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5.3 Multilateral agencies, 
research agencies, donors and 
NGOs
Integration into related initiatives
The IFC, World Bank and other multilateral and bilateral 
agencies (donors) are currently developing land investment 
principles to prevent ‘land grabbing’. These could include 
requirements to assess and disclose GHG impacts. This could 
pave the way for rewarding lower-carbon FDI and help the 
national governments assess GHG emissions (MRV) where 
these investments are taking place. To facilitate this, these 
organizations could develop easy to read-and-apply manuals 
or tools to help investors and companies understand and 
quantify the environmental impact of agricultural investments. In 
addition, they could explore the possibility of a GHG mitigation 
incentive component being introduced under the Global 
Agriculture and Food Security Program.
Design and testing mechanisms
Where these organizations operate in relevant countries, they 
could also test and evaluate ways of delivering GHG mitigation 
benefits to smallholders, and the effectiveness of the different 
types of benefits (type, quantities and timing of these). This 
evaluation should consider how GHG mitigation benefits 
distribution, and GHG MRV initiatives could piggyback on 
existing information initiatives for smallholders.15 
Facilitate agricultural extension
Another important role to play is to facilitate the provision of 
better agricultural extension services, including on-site and 
remote training programmes, and demonstration projects. 
They could address both GHG mitigation and adaptation. One 
issue that an interviewer mentioned was the inconsistency 
of agricultural extension services and advice provided by 
NGOs and other providers. Ensuring that collaboration and 
coordination exists when offering extension services, between 
these agencies, government and any locally operating private 
sector entities, is important. Guidelines could be developed, 
and organizations should sign up to these when providing 
agricultural extension services.
Support governments in service provision
These types of organizations can also provide support to 
governments to help them develop better institutions and 
processes. For example, they could assess government 
tenure and business registration arrangements for smallholder 
mitigation activities and work with governments to overcome 
these. They could also conduct and make available market 
research on smallholder requirements related to mitigation 
(and adaptation) so that government institutions and potential 
investors can better develop appropriate products and 
services. In addition, they could work with governments to 
facilitate competitions to demonstrate how GHG mitigation 
can be incorporated into agricultural development initiatives 
that include smallholders, such as in the African Enterprise 
Challenge Fund (AECF). This could include elements for MRV 
and a guaranteed purchase of some, or all of the resulting 
mitigation by donors or multilateral funds. Finally, they could 
support standard-setting and local certification agencies in 
developing countries, particularly where mitigation opportunities 
are highest.
Building and strengthening local institutions
Institutions with a strong local presence can help by building 
bodies that aggregate smallholders, both horizontally and 
vertically, particularly focusing on women’s participation and 
representation. They can also provide the necessary upfront 
funding and human resources required to develop smallholder-
relevant businesses with positive GHG mitigation impacts. This 
could include facilitating ‘patient capital’ and similar blended 
funding instruments to leverage greater (and better quality) 
commercial investment in agriculture that provides benefits to 
the climate and to smallholders.
5.4 Carbon finance and policy-
makers engaged in climate 
change activities
Consider smallholders
Policy-makers focused on climate change should concentrate 
on the long-term viability and requirements of smallholder 
businesses (assets, risks, financing) when designing and 
implementing mitigation incentives. This requires thought as 
to who would generate the mitigation and how they would 
benefit - both financially and non-financially. They may also 
wish to carefully consider and design co-benefit offerings 
with smallholders and other potential stakeholders, such as 
potential investors (for example, private companies) so that 
they are adequate and appropriate. 
Continue to develop and test project and non-project based 
approaches
Carbon financiers and policy makers may wish to consider 
ways to reduce reporting or MRV costs and the complexity of 
attaining mitigation benefits through collaborations with various 
types of organizations. Also, they should focus on promoting 
high quality projects through risk-mitigation instruments and 
standards. Good business practices should be employed, 
encompassing transparency, including facilitating mechanisms 
to increase GHG benefit transparency. Policy makers should 
promote liquidity and market certainty, if pursuing a market-
based approach.
15  For example, build on the following initiatives: WorldAgInfo, Value-Chain 
Information System for Agriculture (VISA), real-time delivery of agricultural 
information to smallholders in Africa and South Asia through village based 
knowledge systems implemented by community knowledge workers / village 
knowledge centers, community radio support systems, low cost soil testing 
schemes etc. (Allen and Ochs 2008).
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This paper proposes that international financial mechanisms 
established as a result of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change are largely inaccessible 
to smallholder groups who have important roles to play in 
reducing net global greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). The 
purpose of this paper is to examine the finance and risk-related 
obstacles that hinder smallholders from participating in carbon 
finance mechanisms and to suggest a framework for prioritizing 
and aggregating smallholders to achieve mitigation at scale. 
The author submits that smallholders can play a significant role 
in the mitigation of climate change, supporting this by:
1. Defining smallholders in a global context, and detailing their 
importance to climate change mitigation and adaptation, 
particularly as aggregated groups managing large areas of 
land. While reminding the reader of current carbon finance 
schemes, the author asserts that the issue of scale is 
important to achieve meaningful results and suggests that 
incentives linked to terrestrial mitigation can have significant 
social and economic benefits.
2. Identifying eight potential sources of funding for smallholder 
activities and examining risks that smallholders face on a 
daily basis, compounded by climate change. The author 
claims that risk management strategies can reduce the 
incidence and severity of adverse events and may be an 
important co-benefit when smallholders participate in 
climate mitigation programmes.
3. Comparing smallholder versus carbon financier require-
ments and providing a general framework for developing 
approaches for large-scale mitigation activities that include 
smallholders.
4. Recommending suitable action to various stakeholders 
including governments, private investors, donors and 
policy-makers.
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